Review of Lloyd P. Gerzon (ed.), Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy by Peña, Lorenzo
Lorenzo Peña
Review of:
Lloyd P. Gerzon (ed.)
Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and
Medieval Philosophy
Presented to Joseph Owens
Philosophia
XIX/1
(Bar Ilan University, (Israel)
may 1989)
pp. 73-79
ISSN 0048-3893.
GRACEFUL REASON: ESSAYS IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY PRESENTED TO JOSEPH
OWENS, Edited by Lloyd P. Gerson. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,
1983. pp. 447. Paperback.
This is an excellent Festschrift. The contributors’ scholarship is thorough and well-
attested. The editor’s work has been painstaking and conscientious — a complete bibliography
of works by and on Father Owens is appended; the indexes are helpful. The volume is well-
edited and printed — except for a number of misprints, mainly to be found in the papers in
Italian. The drawbacks from which the book suffers pertain rather to the kind of publication it
is: too many subjects by too many authors, often with insufficient space to develop their themes.
Let me focus on a few of the papers without detracting from the value of the others.
Walter Leszl’s paper «L’argomento contro i molti in DK 29BI e il procedimento di
Zenone» sets forth a detailed analysis of one of Zeno’s arguments against the many. Leszl
discusses and rebuts Solmsen’s, Frankel’s and Barnes’s views to the effect that Zeno was not
serious in his argument against plurality. To the reviewer’s mind, Leszl is quite right there and,
in fact, those views are but a token of an unfortunately widespread tendency to either misapply
the exegetic principle of charity, or else look upon any philosophical tenet emerging as hardly
retrievable by application of that principle as a joke of aorta which in the end is nothing else
but another way of failing to take fundamental disagreements in philosophy seriously. Common
as those abuses are in other fields of the philosophical history of philosophy, they reach their
peak in ancient philosophy, with very few people being prepared to acknowledge that Hera-
cleitus accepted true contradictions or that Plato meant what he said in the Parmenides and
Sophist dialogues.
Leszl makes it clear that Zeno not only grasped but also used the techniques of reductio
argument. His concluding remark though (pp. 26-27) is that Zeno’s own argument tells not just
against the many but also against the Parmenidean One, since the latter is conceived of as
having largeness — while Zeno’s argument shows that whatever has largeness is made up of
many things, some infinitely large and some lacking any largeness at all, which is absurd. Leszl
refutes Furley’s solution to the effect that Zeno’s adding ‘piαχος’ in his argument shows that
what is ruled out is not every and any largeness but such largeness alone as includes physical
density. According to Leszl, instead, Zeno implicitly dissented from both Parmenides and
Melissos.
Leszl is not wholly convincing on this issue. Furley seems to me to be right: having
mere µεγεϑος may fail to entail being divided into parts, while having piαχος (mass, bulk,
thickness: see LSI for references) may not: Zeno’s argument can be read as a proof that what-
ever largeness the One may have, it is indivisible. (But cannot one who believes in the many
argue that each of them has that kind of largeness? In fact many atomists have suggested or
even contended that such is the case. Zeno might reply that if the move is legitimate when you
set at the purported atoms, why not at the very start, i.e., concerning the whole composed out
of those atoms?)
G. Verbeke’s «The Meaning of Potency in Aristotle» (pp. 55-73) is a bold attempt at
making sense of Aristotle’s (pseudo)modal notion of potency. I find, however, that Verbeke’s
reading is generally unsuccessful. His is one of those interpretations which miss out Aristotle’s
irreducible ways of being, viz. act and potency — which cannot be analyzed into, or explained
away it terms of, modal notions, but rather the other way round. What seems to me most wrong
is Verbeke’s claim that the «potency of a being is not unlimited, it is confined within the
boundaries of a particular area» (p. 56). What is thus being denied is Aristotle’s own conception
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of pure potency — and, as a consequence, his view of prime matter. Verbeke’s en tire paper is
but a series of variations on that (to my mind) misconstruction. Thus (p. 57): «The concept of
potency seems to be closely connected with that limited scope of possibilities which are present
in a particular being… If the evolution were from mere non-being to actualization, it would be
hard to explain why a process of becoming is possible in some cases and not in others».
Verbeke tries not merely to conserve Aristotle’s doctrine but also to buttress it («So we may
conclude that potency is present almost everywhere» are his final words).
As an exegetical essay, the paper is flawed because of its failing to envisage the alterna-
tive interpretation that the Stagirite meant what he said when he spoke of prime matter and pure
potency; such an interpretation may be backed up by many considerations, e.g., that if the struc-
ture of act and potency is going to explain anything, it must be taken to its ultimate appli-
cations: as coming to know calls for having been able to acquire such a state, which is a near
potency, likewise coming to be a substance capable of learning calls for a previous potency of
such a coming to be, which potency is nothing else but pure potency, i. e. prime matter — a
potency not within the boundaries of any particular entity at all, but precisely a potency for
anything whatsoever, which in itself (actually) is neither a what nor a how much nor a how, and
so boundless. Verbeke fails to quote and discuss such texts as at least prima facie support this
construction. He also refrains from going into a philosophical examination of the difficulties
surrounding Aristotle’s «basic significance [of ‘potency’] which is found everywhere where
potency is involved: it is a principle of change in something else or in the same being insofar
as it is other (Metaph. ix, 1, 104a9-ll)» (p. 57, n. 8). That such statements are puzzling doesn’t
even deserve mention, according to Verbeke. This is another reason why I think that his essay
also does not successfully defend Aristotle’s view of potency: any such defence ought to take
into account the difficulties involved and then try to dispel them, which Verbeke does not.
In fact Verbeke is a (too) convinced Aristotelian, who takes for granted what should
rather be argued for: that the notion of potency is free from major difficulties and that it
usefully applies to our common experience. AntiAristotelian philosophers allege that the notion
is unenlightening and definitely contradictory since, when potency is actualized, it is so «not
as such but as something else» — which statement brinks on overt contradiction, which it avoids
only by availing itself of the reduplicative «as», which may be regarded as a disreputable
device, since it enables one to hide the logical consequences of what one is claiming and, thus,
to salvage any theory whatsoever. But, if we are to countenance true contradictions, the en tire
purpose of the Aristotelian dichotomies (act/potency, form/matter) is lost, since they aimed at
nothing else but avoiding such contradictions as seemed to be entailed by other philosophical
views — in particular, a number of Platonic claims. Even when Verbeke quotes some of the
thorniest Aristotelian contentions — (e.g., p. 59, n. 17 on 1042a 25-9 and 1044b 27), that matter
is not even an individual being in act and that it is unknowable — he fails to discuss, and even
perhaps to realize, the difficulties such claims are subject to; nor does he show awareness of
another difficulty, this one concerning form or act «as such»: act (actuality) gives (matter,
potency) what nevertheless it lacks, i. e., what it attains solely by actualizing or informing
matter; thus, form «as such» cannot be actual; and then how can it actualize? How can it be
knowable «as such», while it only exists when it is actualizing matter and when, accordingly,
it does not exist as such but as something else, too? Finally, how can substances be «composed
of matter and form» (p.64, referring to 1042a 35-31) when neither matter nor form are ever
actual entities, at least ‘as such’?
Most of all, Verbeke’s clinging to his idea that any potency takes place within (some)
boundaries — those of the entity whose concrete and particular potency it is — fails to make
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allowance for Aristotle’s purpose of accounting for things «evolv[ing] beyond the boundaries
of their present situation» — as he himself puts it, on p.60. Verbeke says that potency «is a
positive orientation towards certain kinds of evolution, whereas others are excluded» (p. 67),
an orientation «stem[ming] from the nature of things» (ibid.), which ruling out is incompatible
with Aristotle’s point, viz. that any such nature is something that the thing has in act, which
having must have been preceded by the thing’s (or more exactly, the matter’s) being able to
acquire it, i. e., by pure potency. (So, when Verbeke himself quotes Aristotle [on p. 58: he
refers to Phys. 191a8-13] as claiming that prime matter «is merely potential, without any formal
determination», I feel sure he’s short of realizing how damaging that claim is for his own
construction, which implicitly rules out any but accidental potency alone, i. e., such potency as
an actual substance is actually endowed with.) Thus, Verbeke manages to make Aristotle’s
ontology sound commonsensical at the price of. waiving its depth and scope.
Other insufficiencies I find in Verbeke’s essay are: its failing to mention recent dis-
cussion on those and related topics by R.M. Dancy, J. Hintikka, S. Waterlow, M.J. White,
Sorabji, Lindsay Judson, Ronald Polansky, Kirwan, Robin Smith, H. R. King, W. Charlton, A.R.
Lacey, F. Solmsen, H. M. Robinson and others; its even failing to take into account the (old)
Scholastic discussions about them; last and least, its charitable construction of Megarians, viz.
that «[w]hat they probably assert is that nobody could ever prove the potency to be there when
it is not being actualized» (p.61, n.24) and that «Megarians [don’t] totally deny the existence
of potency» (p . 62), a gratuitous interpretation to my mind, ensuant on the above criticized
method in the history of philosophy.
H.B. Veatch’s essay (pp. 75-100) is concerned with tracing all errors in contemporary
metaphysics to «the transcendental turn», which Veatch looks upon as the view according to
which «the business of the philosopher … is not at all to know reality as it is, so much as it is
to project various all-embracing categorial schemes … through which reality can come to be
ordered and structured for purposes of our better human manipulation and control of it» (p. 77-
78). That, as Veatch contends (p.80, n.9), analytical philosophy (as a hole) partakes of such a
«turn» seems to me quite wrong.
Furthermore, not everyone ready to be counted among users of transcendental arguments
would accept Veatch’s characterization: why cannot a «transcendentalist» think that what he
is securing is a view of how reality is, even if among the premises upon which he relies are
some claims about our thought, or our language? Doubtless Frege and Russell — at least through
some period of their respective evolutions — accepted that we can reach a view of reality by
means of considerations on language; and, somehow or other, most analytical philosophers have
agreed to that — even though most of them grant that, since the method is part guesswork, we
never secure (absolute) certainty about how the world is; but surely realism and certainty are
different and separated issues. That misconstruction of the analytic enterprise seems to flaw all
Veatch has to say about Russell (pp. 89-91), Bergmann (pp. 92ff) and Quine (pp. 96ff).
Veatch’s crusade against the «roadblock of transcendentalism» (p. 99) leads him to a lot of con-
fusion. Russell did not devote himself to «an analysis of logical propositions» (p. 89), but to
a logical analysis of propositions (or, more accurately, sentences) and, through and beyond that,
to an ontological analysis of the world. Nor do «all modern logicians» (p. 91) contend «that,
insofar as universality attaches to the subject term of any proposition, the proposition has not
been fully analyzed; and that further analysis will disclose how any and all of the universal
elements or features attaching to subject terms need to be analyzed out and relegated to the
predicate-place». No, of course not. Some of those «modern logicians» are realists and contend
that reference — in subject-term position if you want — to universals is unavoidable. (Quine
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himself is one of those who do not; whether he is right in viewing universals as extensional is
outside the present question; Veatch implicitly agrees with Hochberg’s assessing of Quine’s
view, although he fails to refer to the discussion; to the reviewer’s mind, both are wrong on that
point.) Even though Veatch’s allegations against «modern logia» (on pp. 91-93) have some
point — (witness Frege’s puzzles about «the concept horse», i. e., a serious difficulty concerning
the reading of higher order functional calculus sentences in terms of ordinary language, as well
as what Veatch calls the «relational character of predication») — he fails to consider extant
alternatives: set-theory (and related calculi) for one — which manage to refer to universals
without encountering Frege’s troubles — and, most of all, combinatory logics, which are free (or,
as free as it is possible to be) of both those drawbacks. (Why not consider, for example, Fitch’s
ontology of states of affairs?) Withal, Veatch also fails to realize that Aristotle’s categorial
ontology falls afoul of the same or quite similar difficulties — unless, of course, we deem it all
right to fall back on the piρος εν equivocation of which Veatch makes so much, an equivocation
saddling us with having to accept «an ‘it’, considered simply as a material possibility to be
what ‘it’ is» which «is only as a potentiality or ability to be something, or to be what it is» (pp.
87-88), an «it» — pure potency or matter — which only «by equivocation» may be said to be
at all. One wonders whether whatever is meant — or referred to — by the predicate which has
thus been attached to that «it» in the just uttered sentence is actually had (or «been») by the
«it» under consideration, and whether that «it» can be said to be of that ilk simpliciter or only
by equivocation, and so on and so forth. Moreover, if such a view is tenable, why not formalize
it? Even if Veatch regards formalization as pointless, he should be aware that it would, at the
very least, render his position far more convincing.
Another essay in the volume which invites many interesting philosophical questions is
Cornelio Fabro’s «Intorno al fondamento dell’essere» (pp. 229-237), the main intent of which
is commenting on some points of the Heideggerian Kehre — and of course trying to join them
with Aquinas’ irreducibly original view of esse, according to Fabro. I find astounding what
Fabro says on p. 236: that the scholastic distinction of essentia and exsistentia was (conceived
of as being) purely of reason cum fundamento in re! But of course, even if Fabro is bent on
maintaining that Thomists have forgotten or misconstrued Aquinas’ own original distinction,
such a claim wholly ignores the many well-argued discussions on that issue among the different
Schools, with most Scholastics — not just Thomists, but also Scotists and others — recognizing
that between essence and existence in finite beings there exists a difference which is not purely
of reason. In general, Fabro takes too many things for granted, which lessens the strength of his
otherwise suggestive, historical considerations. Fabro’s paper could have benefited from a
discussion of various ways of construing Aquinas’ doctrine of essence and existence — like G.
Lindbeck’s «Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas» (Francis-
can Studies, 1957, pp. 1-22, 107-25). Fabro seems most unfair in his attitude towards «strict
Thomists» like Manser, Billot or Garrigou-Lagrange and of course towards traditional Thomism,
which is dismissed as being downright opposed to Aquinas’ own doctrine (p. 235, n. 16; p. 237
and passim.)
Many philosophically interesting questions are also mooted in C.J. de Vogel’s paper
«Deus Creator Omnium: Plato and Aristotle in Aquinas’ Doctrine of God» (pp. 203-227), which
shows a rare mastery as well as an acute sensitivity as regards some of the ontological prob-
lems. The reviewer agrees with most of what Professor de Vogel has to say on Plato and the
Neoplatonics. Although I don’t share de Vogel’s view on St. Thomas’ doctrine of God — as
«introducing Plato’s metaphysics of transcendent Being into the formal void of Aristotle’s Prime
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Mover’s Mind» — I think here is a challenging, illuminating essay whose arguments are not to
be ignored.
Similarly thorough in its scholarship as well as insightful — if sometimes highly contro-
versial — is the concluding essay, N. Wells’s paper on Araujo’s view of eternal truths. Other
outstanding papers deal with themes in Aristotle, Aquinas, Maimonides, Plotinus, Albert the
Great, etc. Among the authors are Ralph McInerny, John M. Rist and other distinguished
scholars.
